


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INTELLIGENCE

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PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
Office of the AC of S, G-2  
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E   B U L L E T I N

No 15 - 4 May 45

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*A. W. Tyson*

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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE: - Possible 75mm gun emplacement, constructed of earth and palm logs. This emplacement is located on a rise back of the beach, south of the MARABING R., LEYTE.

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## Increased Jap Security Consciousness

(From Hq, Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 81, 28 Mar 45  
and PAC MIRS Bulletin No. 15, 30 Mar 45.)

One of the least security-conscious of all modern armies, the Japanese Army has been slow to recognize its failings in this respect and even slower to take adequate corrective measures.

Chief significance of the following order issued by the 8th Div, long before our LUZON landing, is the belated recognition of the very great amount of valuable information derived from Jap documents and PsW. This document is one of the very few official enemy documents acknowledging the fact that Japs are taken prisoner - a status formerly considered impossible. Characteristically, however, instead of outlining a sound indoctrination program telling the Japs exactly how to conduct themselves upon being captured, the directive prescribes "spiritual training," the panacea which is supposed to cure everything from hunger to shortage of ammunition.

Evidence that this and other similar directives may have taken root is seen in the fact that in some LUZON areas and among some enemy units enemy dead have been devoid of identifications and documents; other areas and units have, however, yielded the usual rich haul of documentary information. LUZON PsW have almost without exception proved as valuable and truthful as in previous campaigns.

"According to special intelligence, the enemy has obtained extremely accurate and detailed information on movements, armament, organization and strength dispositions of our land and air forces within and without JAPAN. It is concluded that most of this information has been obtained from our captured 'Top Secret' documents. There is also some evidence that a part of the intelligence is from notebooks, etc. of an officer belonging to a high headquarters. A considerable amount of information is noted as obtained from PW sources.

"From the above, the need for adequate counterintelligence measures in the handling of 'Top Secret' documents can be readily realized. Hereafter, the strictest care will be taken in counterintelligence measures for the restriction of copy numbers and distribution of printed documents, immediate decrease in number of documents carried, and careful burning of documents after use. Strict enforcement of these measures will be required so that there will be no mishap in disposing of 'Top Secret' documents under any circumstances. Thorough spiritual training will be given for those unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner."

Another Jap document captured on LUZON 17 Jan 45 and entitled, "Instructions Concerning Prisoners of War," issued by CHINA Expeditionary Army Staff Section describes possible courses of action for the Jap soldier who is taken prisoner and also considers the possibility of his divulging to his captors information of military value.

"Now that the enemy has expanded his guerrilla warfare over a wide area, and we are confronting him with an extremely small portion of our strength, the fear will arise that there will be frequent opportunities of being captured.

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## INCREASED JAP SECURITY CONSCIOUSNESS

"There are men who lapse into inactivity when wounded or tired, although they could do something better. This is truly a source of mortification to the army. It indicates a general weakening of spiritual strength, and undoubtedly emanates from the influence of materialistic thought. This requires grave consideration from the educational side, in view of the thought currents within the country which the adolescent may encounter.

"An investigation shows that our soldiers, up to the time they are captured, attempt a stubborn resistance. After falling into the enemys hands, however, their spirit is broken. Many respond willingly to the enemy's treatment, and many maintain a firm attitude at first and later soften. According to enemy reports, captives at the beginning of the incident did not divulge military secrets readily, revealing things only gradually after torture (GOMON), but more recently they have been quicker to talk. It must be said that this information has been confirmed."

"Maru 6"

(From Hq, AAF, SWPA Intelligence Summary No 264  
24 Mar 45.)

A Jap 2nd Class petty officer captured off CORREGIDOR island on 17 Feb 45 described a one-man suicide weapon which he had seen hanging on a crane in MANILA Harbor. PW was told at that time that this weapon was called the "MARU 6." It was described by PW as a large torpedo with a conning dome about the size of a 50 gallon oil drum, and a periscope attachment. PW could not accurately describe the dimensions of this weapon; whether as large as, or larger than the usual large type Japanese naval torpedo (61 cm) (24 in.).

The use of the torpedo, PW was told, was for it to approach its target at usual torpedo depth of about four meters (13 ft), completely submerged except for the periscope. The latter could be lowered into the conning dome if desired. PW did not know what these would use for bases and thought there was no outfit using them in the MANILA Bay area, even though he saw one at MANILA Harbor in Nov 44. He also stated that the number of them in JAPAN was not comparable to the "Maru 2" or the "Maru 4" (Jap suicide surface craft). There was a considerable number of the latter small boats in SASEBO where PW's unit was organized in Sept 44, but he had seen none at all of the "Maru 6" at either KURE or SASEBO in Aug - Sept 44. (CINCPAC-CINCPAC Intel Bull Vol 1, No 41, 23 Apr 45 describes a similar, perhaps the same type, piloted torpedo captured incomplete from a ULITHI reef).

### BRIEFS

#### IS NOTHING SACRED?

"Troops should endeavour to camouflage fully the entrances to hidden caves. It is believed that one good plan is to deceive US troops by constructing naturally sited outhouses, which US troops thoroughly dislike, near the entrances to the caves, thereby causing them to avoid these areas." So read a Jap document captured at KADENA airfield, 5 Apr 45. (24th Corps G-2 Language Report, 7 Apr 45)  
(CONFIDENTIAL)



## Reorganization of 23rd Division

(From MID, WD, Wash, D.C. Military Research Bulletin  
No 11, 28 Mar 45.)

Jap divisions which moved from MANCHURIA to the PHILIPPINES underwent a reorganization similar in many respects to that exemplified by that of the 23d Division, i.e., the divisions were organized along the lines of "Standard" type divisions but the size of the various components was materially reduced. The Japanese are continually experimenting with new types of organizations to meet changed operational conditions, and the smaller divisions, which are more flexible for combat purposes, are a natural evolution from the older and larger formations, which are more suitable for garrison and training purposes.

Although strength may be reduced, the fire power per man has been increased in the reorganized 23d Division, with small arms of modern design being issued to all combat troops and 105mm Howitzers replacing the 75mm guns in the artillery regiment.

Details of the new organization of the 23d have been made available from captured documents. The 23d Division, which was a "Strengthened" type division with a total strength of approximately 26,000 was reorganized along the lines of a "Standard" type, except that the size of its components is much lower. The chart on the opposite page shows the T/O and armament of the division as reorganized.

--- continued next page ---

### BRIEFS

#### JAPAN LOOKS AT RUSSIA

It is the general opinion of the people in MANCHURIA that the Russians will invade MANCHURIA through the KOANTO Province. This opinion arises mainly from the fact that in 1938 there was an "incident" during which Russian tanks overran the inadequately equipped Japanese installations. In 1941-1942 there was a growing tenseness between Russian and Japanese border garrisons but this was lessened in 1943 and 1944.

(PW Interr. MIS, WD Rpt 15 Mar 45) (SECRET)

23 Division Total Strength 14,212

Div Hq  
(236)

64 Inf Regt (2,846)	71st Inf Regt (2,846)	72d Inf Regt (2,846)	Rcn Regt (439)	17th FA Regt (1,898)	Transport Regt (749)	Medical Unit (699)	Engr Unit (388)	Sig Unit (210)
Hq (97)	Hq (103)	Hq (56)	Hq (159)	Hq (61)	Hq (232)			
Inf Bn (807)	1 GD Co (180)	Mtd Co (129)	2 LMG Bn (678)	MT Co (145)	Amb Co (170)			3 x Fld Hosp (Ea. 242)
Inf Bn (807)	9 LMGs 9 GDs Co (180)	Mtd Co (129)	12 x 105 mm hows Bn (897)	3 LMG MT Co (145)	Litter Co (99)			Vet Depot (52)
Inf Bn (807)	Co (180)	Armd Car Co (38)	12 x 150 mm hows Regtl Am Tn (164)	3 LMG Draft Co (398)	Litter Co (99)			Water Purif & S Sect (196)
Inf Gun Co (123)	HMG Co (120)	Armd Car Co (38)	2 LMG	3 LMG	Litter Co (99)			Ord Serv Unit (81)
4 x 75mm	8 HMGs	5 Armd Car-HMG						
Antitank Gun Co (72)	Inf Gun Plat (44)	5 Armd Car-37						
4 x 37 mm	2 x 70 mm	Sig Plat (49)						
Sig Co (133)								

Note: The 13th Ind FA Bn, with a strength of approximately 600 and an armament of 12 x 75 mm field guns, was attached to the division.



## Clothing and Uniforms

(From HQ SWPA Allied Air Forces Intelsum No 263, 18 Mar 45)

To help in distinguishing friend or foe from a place of concealment, these notes and illustrations at A and B have been gathered from ATIS, Psw, MIS-X and Air Operations Memorandum No 60, NACICOMAIRPAC.

Since it is often quite impossible, even for experts, to differentiate between Chinese and Japanese on purely physical grounds, this compilation concerns itself only with wearing apparel, military and civilian.

There is little or nothing different in the appearances of the peasants of FORMOSA and Southeast CHINA. Characteristically, as in the drawing at A (see facing next page), the peasant wears a conical hat covered with bamboo leaves, an indigo blue jacket which has four or five string-like buttons made of cloth, indigo blue pants rolled up above the knees - and will be bare-footed or possibly shod with sandals.

If a man is working out in the fields of FORMOSA or CHINA, he is almost surely not a Japanese. Also, Japanese are unlikely to go bare-footed. As in the sketch at A, the enemy civilian is likely to be wearing a towel (often tied under the chin), an English cap or a Panama hat for headgear, a khaki colored jacket with four pockets or just a white shirt, khaki pants inside leggings or puttees and leather shoes or boots. This semi-military garb on the part of the Japanese civilians can be attributed to "Home guard" or student training activities.

Also in the drawings at A, note that the Chinese guerrilla too appears to favor a towel or coarse-cloth turban effect as head-dress. (It has not been reported, however, that he ever fastens it beneath his chin as does the Japanese in the preceding paragraph). Otherwise, his description coincides with that of an ordinary peasant with the possible addition of a broad sash around his midriff.

Japanese regulars may be garbed in dark khaki or forest-green, whereas Chinese regular uniforms will be faded-appearing light green or blue - often baggy. The service caps of both forces are peaked but quite dissimilar in the flatter crowned aspect of the Chinese version. Unmistakable cap devices are the five-pointed star of Nippon and the 12-pointed star of China.

A PW has stated that the uniforms depicted in photographs (ATIS) at B may be encountered in southeast China.

Photo I: (A) and (C) are examples of the summer uniform worn by Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers with collar turned down and badge of rank on lapels. (B and 7) are the same item with collar up. (26) is the current summer uniform for WOs and Officers. Other items are: (56) Puggaroo or Havelock, all ranks; (64) Leather Ankle Boots, Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers; (68) Long Puttees, Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers - sometimes worn by WOs and Officers, (69) Leather Leggings. Privates in Cavalry and Transport - sometimes worn by all ranks in other branches; (88) Leather Knee Boots, WOs and Officers - sometimes worn by Probationary

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CLOTHING AND UNIFORMS

Officers; (91) Gloves, various types; (94) Army Sword, Japanese pattern - adopted 1938, Privates and NCOs in Cavalry and Transport, also NCOs attached HQ all branches - Sgt Majors, all branches; (96) Army Sword, Japanese Pattern - adopted 1930, Probationary Officers, WOs and Officers; (104) Sword Frog, Officers, probationary Officers and WOs.

Photo II: Here is a common uniform for warm climates. Note again the Havelock or puggaree attached to the service cap. (46) indicates the haversack carried by Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers. (59) is a camouflage net for steel helmets.

Photo III: (15) illustrates the experimental tropical shirt worn by Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers.

Photo IV: (A) exemplifies the summer uniforms for Privates, NCOs and Probationary Officers without the tunic and puttees while off duty.

Not shown at all is a uniform encountered in SWPA consisting of shorts reaching just below the knees and shirts with sleeves cut off high on the fore-arm. Material and color are similar to US sun-tans. This may be reserved for extreme tropical climates or fatigue dress.

The familiar "tabi" or rubber-soled shoe, with or without the split-toe peculiar to the Japanese, also has not been reproduced. PsW have said that it is normally worn for special purposes such as negotiating slippery or difficult terrain. Since it has been seen worn with a winter uniform, it is probably in addition an off-duty or fatigue item.

As a final word of caution, it is patent with troops of all armies under combat conditions to adopt and adopt a motley array of body covering. This may be chronic with the Japanese in time of stress and warrants obvious caution.

--- See illustrations on facing  
and following page. ---


#### BRIEFS

##### I WANT TO GO HOME

Lt Col MIEDA, commander of the artillery unit, 2d Mixed Brigade, with thirteen other Japs, were found dead in an IWO cave. Near his body was a paper written in English, which read: "Silent! If you talk, we shall kill you. Quickly start this island, and go to Japan. If we returned Japan. We shall save your life. We have thress groups in this place. Quickly start." Presumably this group of Japs intended to infiltrate to the airfield and force a pilot to fly them to Japan.  
(G-2 Periodic Report No 16, Hq, AGF 86, 11 April 45) (SECRET)

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# IDENTIFICATION: CHINESE AND JAPANESE



CHINESE REGULAR



FORMOSAN CHINESE



FORMOSAN JAPANESE



CHINESE GUERILLA



# JAPANESE TROPICAL-SUMMER UNIFORMS



II

III

15



IV



I

FIG. B



# Jap Convoy Anti Aircraft Fire

(From OSS, Wash, D.C. Report #A-53460, 10 Apr 45)

Allied planes bombing small convoys of small vessels off the CHINA Coast should be warned that one vessel in each Japanese convoy is now usually equipped with three types of anti-aircraft operating on the mortar principle. A Japanese crew member captured on PINGTAN Island states that type 1 (following) is supposed to explode at 4,000 meters (13,120 ft); and type 2 at 5,000 meters (16,400 ft) and type 3 at 4,000 meters (13,120 ft). The prisoner admits doubt of the claimed effectiveness.

A demonstration of the above types of anti-aircraft was arranged at NANPING, using original equipment, with the following results:

Type 1. This is a light papier mache ball 15 centimeters (5.9 in.) in diameter, placed in the bottom of a rough iron tube 4 ft high. It is ignited by lighting an almost instantaneous cord fuze retained near the mouth of the tube. The interval between the propulsion explosion and the explosion in the air is 3 seconds, at a height difficult to estimate but approximately 1000 meters (3,280 ft) (thought to be about 1/4 the theoretical performance). After a few seconds, 2 cotton parachutes opened out, their diameter two ft, each carrying an explosive charge about the size of a flashlight battery. Their characteristics are unknown but they did not explode on contact with the ground or after hurling. In one instance the fuze failed to ignite the projectile. In another the parachutes were destroyed in the explosion.

Type 2. This is a metal cylinder about 8 centimeters (sic) (3 in) long including a wooden handle. After removing the adhesive-taped safety device, it is fired as a mortar is fired. After the initial propulsion the projectile disappeared from view, and after an interval of over one minute a powerful explosion occurred at the height of approximately 1000 meters (3,280 ft). Black smoke appeared and then a parachute was observed in the two rounds of fire.

Type 3. This is a rocket-type projectile. It is a metal cased explosive with a charge 25 centimeters (9.8 in.) long, 7 centimeters (2.7 in.) in diameter, and attached to the end is a heavy metal rod, the same length, with tight metal tail fins. The Japanese name is, "High Flying Type 3 Barrage Bomb," and it is fired as a mortar is fired. There is an aerial explosion after about 12 seconds at an unascertainable height. After 17 seconds an artificial silk parachute, which carried an explosive charge, was seen. Below the explosive charge is a piece of rope about 15 feet long, at the end of which is a small burning substance which weaves the rope from side to side but does not effect the downward course of the chute. The weaving motion continues from the height of about 2000 meters (6,560 ft) to within 300 meters (985 ft) of the ground. The possible purpose of this weaving device is to entangle the rope in a propeller, thus drawing the explosive into the path of the blades.

COMMENT:- The following comment comes from informed US sources in CHINA, "The information agrees with previous reports from several sources and is the most detailed so far in the description of the method of propulsion. The Japanese have been experimenting with similar devices for some time. So far we have no known losses from them. They are dangerous to persons and have probably caused accidents in handling after reaching the ground. The idea is that the plane will catch either the cords from the chute to the explosives or a cord underneath, in either case giving a sharp pull on the cords and operating a friction igniter."



# Japanese 15 cm Self-Propelled Gun

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 78, 7 Mar 45)

A Japanese 15cm self-propelled gun was captured by elements of the 40th Inf Div in the hills west of FORT STOTSENBURG. Though no weapon of this type has been recovered by our forces heretofore, a civilian PW captured in the SWPA who revealed many new developments in Japanese armored vehicles mentioned a self-propelled gun of this size. However, sketches made by PW were very much in error.

The weapon recovered was manufactured at the OSAKA artillery arsenal and the chassis on which it was mounted was manufactured in Jan 1942, at the SUGAMO army arsenal.

With certain variations the vehicle on which the gun is mounted resembles the Type 97 medium tank chassis. Hull and turret plates are riveted.

Only HE ammunition was recovered. These rounds used the Type 88 instantaneous fuze.

## Characteristics:

### Vehicle:

Weight	15 tons (approximate)
Length	216 inches
Width	92 inches
Height overall	93 inches
Clearance	15 inches
Crew	3-4 men

### Armament:

Caliber	15cm
Type	38
Elevation	30 degrees
Depression	5 degrees
Traverse	10 degrees
Breech block	Interrupted screw
Rifling	36 L & G, uniform RH twist
Recoil	Hydropneumatic

Remarks: A mount on the right of the gun may be intended for a machine gun.

Since the vehicle is similar to the Type 97 medium tank, and uses the same power plant, it is assumed that the performance of this vehicle would be approximately the same as the Type 97.


No information is available as to the range and muzzle velocity of the gun.

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# JAPANESE 15 cm SELF-PROPELLED GUN

## CAPTURED IN THE VICINITY OF FORT STOTSENBURG



RIGHT SIDE VIEW





LEFT SIDE VIEW



TOP VIEW



FRONT THREE QUARTER VIEW



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## Leyte G-2 Lessons

(From letter, Hq Sixth Army, Subject: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in Leyte Operation, 25 Nov 45)

In a probing critique of methods of operating, based upon the campaign on LEYTE, the following notes pertinent to G-2 are made:

"1. All equipment needed by the D-day echelon of the G-2 Section should be mobile loaded for facility in handling.

2. The section should carry an adequate supply of sand bags and construct a bomb-proof blackout shelter at the first opportunity.

3. Detailed plans should be worked out in advance for the prompt institution of aggressive reconnaissance immediately on landing of the troops.

4. Each intelligence echelon should have a liaison officer with the next lower intelligence echelon. A portable voice radio for passing information prior to establishment of telephone communications ashore should accompany all such liaison officers.

5. Provision must be made for the prompt evacuation of documents to the nearest intelligence echelon in order that information contained therein may be of timely value.

6. G-2's must press the obtaining of identifications from enemy dead. In reporting identifications, the source must be given, i.e., document, dog tag, PW, etc.

7. A good 1 to 50,000 map is available for the entire M-1 area. Post D-day maps and photography will be difficult to obtain; therefore requests for photography must be held to the absolute essential minimum.

8. CIC Detachments, with vehicles and equipment, must be put ashore at the earliest practicable time.

9. CIC Detachments should carry ashore a supply of printed passes for issue to loyal civilians, government officials, Philippine Constabulary and visitors to the CP.

--- continued next page ---

### BRIEFS

#### IWO JIMA CAVES

Thirteen Japs killed on IWO JIMA were covered with the violet smoke which had been used on an enemy engineer cave; indicating that the Japs had escaped from that cave under cover of early morning fog. The smoke had been used the preceding day to determine entrances to the cave. (AGF Periodic Report No 26, 21 April 1945) (SECRET)

LEYTE G-2 LESSONS (CONTD)

10. In the M-1 area few guerrillas are armed. Due to many factions and foreseen difficulties in the area, it is believed inadvisable to supply arms for active combat but rather to employ guerrillas as an undercover information service and as guides.

11. G-2's must quickly learn to evaluate the accuracy of civilian and guerrilla reports and not permit themselves to be led astray. A sound application of intelligence fundamentals and common sense will usually present the right solution. Guerrilla reports are usually more accurate than civilian reports.

12. G-2's must not allow themselves to become engulfed in the handling of civilians. This is a Civil Affairs problem.

13. An order of battle map and a system for keeping up with enemy dead and PsW must be immediately instituted.

BRIEFS

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA

Jap C of S notified his troops as follows: "The enemy has recently been widely scattering propaganda leaflets stating that the LUZON operation has been favorable to him and that anti-war feeling is rising among our troops. Therefore, officers and men of each unit should realize that in actuality, the LUZON operation has been favorable to us. Furthermore, when leaflets are found, they will be handed over to superiors at once.

(SWPA ATIS Bulletin No 1948, 13 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

## Radar Manufacture in Japan

(From WD, MID Report No 4, Japanese Ground Equipment  
7 Apr 45.)

The Japanese electronics industry has not been able to provide adequate supplies of radar, its most vital product, to the armed forces despite the very high priority granted to the radar program and the thorough measures taken to accelerate development and production of better equipment. Although the Japanese have made considerable progress during the past three years, it is apparent that they are still heavily handicapped by the insufficient quantity and poor quality of their radar apparatus.

The principal bottlenecks in the Japanese radar program are believed to be the development of effective new types of radar and the manufacture of sufficient quantities of high quality vacuum tubes. Radar units can be built by most of the leading producers of radio apparatus. Facilities for the development of new equipment are scattered among many laboratories and research centers. The manufacture of tubes, however, is not only the most critical but also the most concentrated point in the entire industry. Tube production requires many skills and very specialized apparatus. One firm, TOKYO Shibaura Denki K.K., produced 58.3 percent of the recovered tubes made solely for radar, 68.3 percent of those used both in radio and radar, and 74.4 percent of those made only for radio use. That firm's tube facilities are believed to be concentrated in three factories located within an area of one square mile in KAWASAKI. The tube factory of SUMITOMO Tsushin Kogyo K.K., the only known maker of some of the most specialized tubes used in radar, is also in KAWASAKI.

The Navy Technical Laboratory (Kaigun Gijutsu Kenkyusho), which is believed to be in the TOKYO area, directs the manufacture of Navy radar and is a large producer of units, but is not known to make any tubes. Until 1942, the Navy directed the development and production of all Japanese radar, and most models now in production and use are still known as Navy radar.

## Artillery Tactics on Luzon

(From Hq, Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 80, 21 Mar 45.)

In the northern zone, Nip artillery, apparently of the 10th Field Artillery Regiment, was increasingly active along the VILLA VERDE Trail and HIGHWAY #5 area, during the period 14-21 March. It will be recalled that previous documents and maps revealed that this unit was to displace a total of seven batteries north of the BALETE PASS area for support of enemy troops in the VILLA VERDE Trail and along HIGHWAY #5. At the end of the period the enemy departed from his accustomed method of firing one or two guns and laid down barrages of as many as 60 rounds in one small area. This fire consisted of 75, 105 and 150mm caliber. That being currently received in the PUTLAN-M'NULI area is the first enemy artillery fire used since the PUNCAN - DIG DIG area fell to our troops.

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## Jap 447 mm Spin Stabilized Rocket

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 78, 7 Mar 45)

Eighty-five of these rockets were recovered in the MANILA Heights Subdivision, LUZON. Civilians in the area stated that the Japanese had brought the rockets in about a month before our landings in LINGAYEN Gulf and for several nights considerable activity was observed in the area. However, no launching device or fuze for this rocket has been found to date.

It is not definitely known whether this weapon has ever been used against our troops in this area though a rocket of similar size has been reported in use on IWO JIMA.

### Characteristics:

Length (overall)	68 $\frac{1}{4}$ inches
Diameter	447mm (17 5/8 inches)
Length of rocket motor	27 inches
Length of explosive head	41 $\frac{1}{4}$ inches
Total weight (estimated)	1500-2000 lbs.
Color	Maroon body, with green nose tip.

The explosive head consists of a barrel and a nose joined by a circumferential weld. At the base of the barrel a reinforcing band is welded inside the barrel to extend aft of it. This extension is threaded to take the base plate of the explosive head. The barrel is 3/4 inch steel. The explosive charge is picric acid. The projectile has a nose fuze pocket. An adapter threaded into the nose permits the use of the Army Type 88 fuze. A picric acid booster cylinder with an Army gaine well fits inside the adapter.

The motor appears also to be made of 3/4 inch steel. At the after end the motor is threaded to take the motor base plate. The rocket motor base plate is simply an enlarged version of the Navy 200m (8 inches) rocket base plate with the addition of six nozzles welded at approximately the same angle as the escape ports of the smaller rocket. The nozzle orifice measures 2 1/32 inches in diameter. The base plate is threaded to take a primer.

The primer flash travels through the perforation in the central propellant stick to a black powder ignition charge in a silk bag which is tied to a perforated plate forward of the propellant charge.

The propellant charge is 39 or 40 sticks of ballistite. According to the label the propellant weight is 60 kg (132 lbs).

To the inner surface of the base plate is fitted a raised grill which prevents the propellant sticks from being forced out through the nozzles. The grill has the appearance of an enlarged "hot plate."

A base cover of light steel is loosely fitted into the base of the rocket and protects against any foreign substance from entering the nozzles.


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UNCLASSIFIED



~~RESTRICTED~~

# 447 MM SPIN STABILIZED ROCKET FOUND IN MANILA, LUZON, P.I.


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
447 mm ROCKETS AS FOUND




BASE PLATE REMOVED TO SHOW  
PROPELLANT INCREMENTS



BASE PLATE OF ROCKET SHOWING CANTED NOZZLES



INSIDE OF BASE PLATE SHOWING GRILL



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# Treatise on the Japanese Air Forces

(Extracts from "Reports of Japanese Air Order of Battle Conference, Washington, D.C., 23 Feb 45.)

At the beginning of the Pacific War the Japanese Air Forces were on the offensive. The Japanese Air Forces were well equipped to carry out the strategic objectives for which they were designed. They were primarily an offensive instrument to be used in support of ground force and amphibious operations. Their aircraft construction sacrificed armor, ruggedness and fire power for manoeuvrability, speed and altitude performance. They had only a limited concept of strategic bombing and a relatively small aircraft production.

By late 1942, after the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal defeats, the Japanese offensive effort had spent itself. They then initiated a program to increase substantially their fighter production and to develop aircraft with greater armament and fire power, self-sealing tanks, and higher speed and altitude performance.

As the Allied offensive got under way in 1943, the pattern of employment of Japanese air power developed clearly. Periods of conservation of strength were followed by periods of intense and sustained activity.

The Japanese learned two things: (1) that once Allied bases were provided with adequate fighter protection, the cost of daylight attacks was prohibitive, and that offensive action was necessarily restricted to occasional small-scale, but effective, night raids; (2) that they could not maintain air strength over an extended period at advance bases once those bases were brought within range of fighter-escorted Allied bombers. In general therefore, they tended to employ their maximum local air capabilities only in opposition to major Allied advances or in efforts to resist the neutralization of vital air bases. The intensity and duration of their resistance to any of these operations appear to have been determined both by the strategic importance which the Japanese attached to the particular area and by the relationship of the losses sustained to the overall requirements for the air defense of their Empire.

Following the final collapse of naval air resistance at RABAU in early Feb 44, and the defeat of the Army Air Force at HOLLANDIA in March, the Japanese made a protracted effort to avoid combat losses in all theaters.

After the Allied occupation of HOLLANDIA, in Apr 44, the Japanese began to increase their air strength in the PHILIPPINES area. This force suffered heavy losses in Sept 44, but the losses were immediately replaced and substantial reinforcements were brought in. Thereafter, beginning with the carrier strikes which preceded the LEYTE operation, strategic conservation was temporarily abandoned.

In its bearing upon future operations, the most significant feature of the PHILIPPINES campaign, from the air standpoint, was the desperate bringing in of replacements and reinforcements from the other areas. By 1 Dec 44, about 44% of the tactical units in the Japanese Army Air Force had been committed. Reinforcements by the Japanese Naval Air Force was on a similar scale, and included the commitment of training units from JAPAN for suicide attacks. Eventually the Japanese Air Forces were forced to withdraw in order to conserve their remaining strength for the defense of

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TREATISE ON THE JAPANESE AIR FORCES (CONTD)

JAPAN proper and adjacent areas, after having suffered a major defeat which reduced the quantity and quality of both the Army and Naval Air Forces.

As to capabilities, the Japanese Air Forces are greatly inferior to the Allied Air Forces, both in size and combat effectiveness, and must remain irrevocably committed to a strategic defensive role. The overall combat efficiency of the Japanese Air Forces continues to suffer from serious deficiencies which tend to offset the large increase in production and the improved performance of combat aircraft. Some of these deficiencies are (1) maintenance facilities and adequately trained and skilled maintenance personnel appear to be insufficient, particularly in the forward areas. (2) The Japanese have encountered mechanical difficulties with the newer types of aircraft and frequently in forward areas a lack of properly trained pilots and crews for these aircraft has been noted. (3) The training programs have been met with difficulty and the Army Air Force training program is likely to be further impaired by the disruption of extensive training facilities in the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA and the southern areas. Though both air forces appear now to have an adequate supply of pilots, replacement personnel in periods of high attrition will be inadequately trained for combat. (4) the Japanese Air Forces also appear to suffer from a lack of competent command throughout all echelons, and as a result have been unable to organize and employ effectively their growing air resources. In view of these deficiencies, the Japanese Air Forces will be unable to reduce materially their qualitative and quantitative inferiority, so long as continued and heavy pressure is maintained against them.

The offensive capabilities of the Japanese Air Forces are limited by (1) the lack of a substantial bomber force, (2) a greatly reduced carrier force, and (3) inability to penetrate successfully the Allied fighter and anti-aircraft defenses. Offensive activity against adequately defended Allied positions must accordingly be limited to small-scale raids, seldom involving as many as 30 planes, and largely carried on at night.

As to defensive capabilities, Japanese fighters continue to prove inferior to Allied fighters. It follows that Allied fighter sweeps and escorted bomber attacks, unless made against heavy numerical odds, cannot be successfully opposed. Unescorted bomber attacks on the main Japanese islands made at altitudes below 30,000 feet will encounter stiff and possibly effective fighter opposition. It is unlikely that the Japanese will ever be able to attain either the concentration or effectiveness of German anti-aircraft fire at high altitudes.

In considering intentions, it seems probable that from now until the end of the war the Japanese Air Forces will give first and over-riding priority to the defense of JAPAN proper. The Japanese are not likely to risk aircraft losses in the defense of any area outside of the main islands of JAPAN, which would reduce overall strength in tactical units below a figure on the order of 2,500 aircraft.

--- continued next page. ---

BRIEFS

JAP FIGHTER PLANE "HAYASE"

On 11 Apr 45, Radio Tokyo beamed to Latin America the following:  
"The Japanese Army has a new fighter plane, the 'Hayase.' The new fighter plane, called 'Hayase' has come to reinforce our air force. It has a four bladed propeller and is faster than the enemy's planes."  
(Radio Tokyo, 11 Apr 45) (RESTRICTED).

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TREATISE ON THE JAPANESE AIR FORCES (CONTD)

JAPAN Proper:- A progressively greater percentage of total Japanese air strength will be concentrated in JAPAN proper. An Allied attack upon KYUSHU or HOKKAIDO will undoubtedly meet with an intense and sustained reaction, but the Japanese will commit all available aircraft only in the final defense of HONSHU.

FORMOSA - RYUKYUS:- Recent continued attacks on FORMOSA and the ferry route through the RYUKYUS have tended to limit the number of tactical units based in FORMOSA. It seems likely that the Japanese will deploy on airfields in KYUSHU, Torpedo and Dive Bomber units which probably had been intended for reinforcement of FORMOSA and RYUKYUS. Thus KYUSHU will become a major air base for the defense of FORMOSA and the RYUKYUS, as well as for the defense of JAPAN proper.

CHINA:- Except as limited by their requirements for JAPAN proper, the Japanese will maintain their strength in CHINA with most of it being concentrated in the coastal areas.

COMMENT:- Movement of Japanese planes to CHINA coastal areas will be principally to coastal airfields located from the SHANGHAI-HANGCHOW area northward. The airfield facilities in the coastal region lying between SHANGHAI-HANGCHOW and CANTON-HONGKONG are limited, and the supply situation and vulnerability to air attack of the CANTON-HONGKONG area would limit the tactical units based there to about the present level.

MANCHURIA:- The Japanese will not reinforce the present low level of their air strength in MANCHURIA until and unless they feel that entry of the USSR into the war is imminent. In this event, the air reinforcements will be drawn for the most part from such air strength as was not committed to the defense of JAPAN proper.

SE ASIA and EAST INDIES:- Japanese air forces deployed south of FORMOSA may be expected to suffer progressive deterioration. The tendency will be to deploy the air strength remaining in the southern areas for the defense of the MALAY Peninsula, PALEMBANG and the FRENCH INDO-CHINA coast.

NORTHERN PACIFIC Area:- Unless and until the Japanese expect an attack from the north only moderate air strength will be based in the KURILES and HOKKAIDO although some reinforcement may be expected as the weather improves this spring.

BRIEFS

75mm CANNON ON TONY

Over TOKYO at more than 12,000 feet were encountered two Jap TONYs firing through propellers with cannon (possibly 75mm caliber). This occurred on a Superfort raid on 12 Apr 45.  
(AAFPOA Radio, 12 Apr 45) (SECRET)

## The Japanese Epic Style

(From SWPA Daily Estimate No 1095, 26/27 Mar 45)

The extravagant style employed by Japanese propaganda is extended to deceive even military organizations. Included in a group of mimeographed instructions by "Yamashita, Tomoyuki, CG of the Shobu Army Group" (14th Area Army) is the following, dated 15 Feb 45, classified "Top Secret."

"The enemy's casualties have reached 60,000 as a result of the daring action of the Army Group. The operation is progressing as planned. The opportunity to crush the American onslaught is closer at hand.

"Orders: - Raise the morale higher. Develop fighting spirit as such to have one man kill 100 enemy soldiers.

"The Army expects to induce and annihilate the enemy on the plains of Central LUZON and in MANILA. The operation is proceeding satisfactorily.

"Whether the enemy's strength and plans will be destroyed in our great counter-offensive depends on the future daring actions of all officers and men. The front line troops and personnel who are responsible for supply transportation in the rear, will develop a fighting spirit and a determination to kill 100 of the enemy for one of our men."

## Possible New Anti-Tank Mine

(From OSS Letter, 27 Mar 45, Subject: New Japanese Material)

The Japanese carried out a test, some 200 yards northwest of the village of THANH TRI (French Indo-China) of a device resembling an anti-tank mine. This test was conducted on 28 Dec 44 by some Jap artillerymen supervised by a Captain.

In appearance the mine was a disc having a detonator protruding slightly from the center of the top surface. Its diameter was 8 to 12 inches, and its thickness 2 to 2½ inches.

The mine was detonated by dropping a stone of about 22 lbs on the detonator from a height of 8 inches. The explosion was described as very violent for a mine so small.

~~SECRET~~

## AFTERMATH OF TOKYO RAID

(From SWPA, ATIS Research Report No.72, Suppl. 1, 19 Mar 1945,  
"Japanese Violations of the Laws of War")

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(Photographic reproduction from the original)

The above is reprinted from a loose printed magazine page with photograph of an Allied Prisoner of War. The document was undated, with owner and unit not stated.

A full translation of the Japanese characters follows:

"A member of the crew of an American airplane picked up by our Army.

"The crews of the American airplanes which raided the Imperial Capital on 18 April (1942) disregarding humane principles bombed high schools, national schools and hospitals. In accordance with military law, our army decided to put them to death or to deal with them severely."

Another reflection of the same occurrence, from a different source, is contained in the BRIEF, printed below.

### BRIEFS

#### JAP VENGEANCE

Jap PW, in telling of the DOOLITTLE Raid, stated that the Japanese reaction was most intense and the newsreel depicting the trial and its verdict was cheered. The reel showed the five flyers stepping off an airplane at their execution area, wearing black eye bands. The black band traditionally denoted death, and a white band imprisonment. Months later, PW heard that the death sentence had been carried out. (SWPA, ATIS, Interr. Report #649, 22 Mar 45) (Secret)

~~SECRET~~





## Order for Disguise

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1885, 22 Mar 45)

Captured at DAMPALIT, LUZON, a Jap document being a "supplementary Order of the 18 Fishing Bn" reads as follows:

"1. Hereafter, the maintenance of boats will be conducted at night or after sunset and before daybreak.

2. Leaving the village at random is prohibited, and when leaving the quarters only a pistol will be carried, and sword will not be worn. Furthermore, jackets or shirts will always be worn so as to hang down over the trousers, and native hats will be worn.

3. Cutting of hair is absolutely prohibited, and after it is long the style of the natives will be immediately assumed. (However, the base of the head may be shaved):

4. When in disguise, nothing should be done to render the disguise meaningless. For instance, when wearing non-military clothing, if a helmet is to be taken along, it should either be worn at the waist or carried in the hand.

-----  
U N C L A S S I F I E D

## Shipboard View of Jap Suicider

"We have been concerned with Jap suicide dive-bombers, and I have seen a good many of them plunge into the ocean, - some remarkably close to us, when I come to think about it. They are properly called 'Suicide Dives,' for our AA fire is quite deadly. As a Jap plane approaches our group, you can see the shell bursts around him. Sometimes they are hit when they are just a small spot in the air. Other times they keep coming in with bursts all around them. As they get closer and closer, you find yourself murmuring to yourself, 'Come on - get him - get him!' And then, when he is quite close, he may explode or burst into flames and plummet into the sea, as we all give out a little cheer, and mumble something about 'teaching him a lesson.'"

### BRIEFS

#### JAPANESE HOMEFRONT

Jap PW expressed the thought that the general feeling of the Jap public was that the war was not going in their favor and many were beginning to feel that JAPAN would be defeated. Propaganda to combat defeatism was used extensively, and stressed patriotism to the Japanese Empire. Prisoner felt that if JAPAN were invaded, there would be mass suicides. (SWPA ATIS Interr. Rpt No 673, 13 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

U N C L A S S I F I E D  
(over)

## Notes on Fifth Column Activity

(From SWPA, ATIS, Current Translations No 156, 21 Mar 45)

Captured at MONGADO, LUZON were loose handwritten sheets containing outlines of counterintelligence, espionage and fifth column activity. The pages were undated, and the writer and unit not stated. Following are excerpts from the translation:-

"The Fifth Column, whether in peace or time of war, has as its aim the hindrance of the activity of the enemy country directly or indirectly and the achievement of plans to our advantage. To further this aim, propaganda and destruction of strategic resources and construction materials may be carried out. Again, there is the strategy of assassinating important individuals and plotting against the country's government, economics or ideas and instigation and guidance in their achievement.

Under "Destruction and assassination of military groups," this document lists "Terror, explosions and infiltration and propagation of poisonous bacteria.

"The Psychological Fifth Column has the greatest results and is the most fearsome of all fifth column activity. There is psychological fifth column warfare against an enemy country and against a neutral.

a. Communism - Planning the overthrow of the state by secret dissemination of propaganda about capitalism.

b. Racism - Race federations are planned by accenting racism and the policy of race riots is formed."

A listing of "Mass Fifth Column Work" reads as follows:

1. Poison - community wells, springs.
2. Bacteria
  - a. Transport of uncultured bacteria
  - b. Culture of bacteria
  - c. Dissemination by airplanes
  - d. Will be disseminated by avoiding sunlight - powdered form
  - e. Wells, rivers, springs, market goods
  - f. Prevent their theft
  - g. Prevent transport of uncultured bacteria
  - h. If not kept in the house during daylight, they are ineffective and they should be inspected from this standpoint.

### BRIEFS

#### JAP FLOATING MINES

US vessels reported floating mines lashed to rafts near OKINAWA. One of these mines blew up as a plane flew over, suggesting some sort of controlled mine. The possibility is also suggested that these mines may be activated by a sonic device.

(From Navy Dispatch) (SECRET)

## Jap AA Trends

(From WD MID Report "Trends in Jap AA Weapons and Defense," 27 Feb 45)

Existence in Japan Proper of a new 88 mm AA Army gun, which is a modification or copy of one of the German 88 mm guns, is now quite definitely confirmed. Known as Model 99 (1939) 8 cm AA Gun by the Japanese, there is evidence that the gun was developed and manufactured from blueprints furnished by the Germans. There is no direct evidence to indicate what German model gun it was copied from, but it is believed that its characteristics are similar to that of either the German 8.8 cm Flak 36 or 37. If this is true, the Japanese gun will probably be capable of a muzzle velocity of approximately 2700 foot seconds, with a maximum vertical range of about 32,500 feet and an effective ceiling approximately equal to that of the 120 mm naval dual purpose gun. It is interesting to note in passing that ammunition for this gun was found at Saipan, but no guns. Prisoner of War information indicates that it was rumored a number of these guns was enroute to Saipan, but that the ship carrying them was sunk and the guns were lost.

Another new Army AA weapon thought to be in current production is a 120 mm AA gun. At least a pilot model of this gun, with a new "locator," was demonstrated near Tokyo in May 1944 to top-ranking Ordnance officers. In the document which covered this demonstration, the maximum vertical range was indicated as 14,000 meters (approximately 45,900 ft). This information would indicate that the 120 mm gun is a very definite improvement over the naval 120 mm dual purpose gun, and is probably a later development. Since the 120 mm Army gun was developed at a time when the capabilities of AAF heavy bombers were being given serious consideration by the Japanese, it is likely that this new Army gun may develop a muzzle velocity of 2800 to 2900 foot seconds. A 120 mm AA gun with such a muzzle velocity would be capable of delivering effective continuously pointed fire up to an altitude of approximately 35,000 feet. There are indications, however, that the Japanese will encounter serious difficulties in effecting any large production of AA guns capable of such high muzzle velocity.

Another new trend in Japanese antiaircraft artillery weapons is the recent appearance and capture of a mechanical type of AA time fuse which is superior in time capabilities and operation to the 30 second powder-train fuse normally used by the Japanese.

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### BRIEFS

#### JAPAN CONTEMPLATES US INVASION

PW reported that the OSAKE ASAHI, an important daily, printed in 1943 a series of articles by noted statesmen on landings which may be expected on JAPAN Proper by the Americans. He remembered that the KII Peninsula was most often mentioned, as an attack there would split the island, for one force would move in the direction of KYOTO and the other towards NAGOYA.  
(PW Interr MIS, WD Report 15 Mar 45) (SECRET)

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JAP AA TRENDS

At the beginning of the war the Japanese Navy excelled the Army in AA automatic weapons. The largest caliber Army AA weapon then in existence was Model 98 (1938) 20mm machine cannon. The Navy on the other hand had the efficient Model 96 (1936) 25 mm automatic cannon, and this weapon on single, dual, and triple mounts has been found in large numbers in land emplaced positions on all important islands of the perimeter defense. The Japanese Navy twin-mount 40 mm gun, a copy of a 1931 single mount British Vickers-Armstrong AA gun, has been found in land-emplaced positions, but it is not considered to be effective or believed to exist in any large numbers. In the Malayan peninsular campaign, however, the Japanese captured about 200 Bofors 40 mm guns from the British, and these guns apparently are still being used by the Japanese Army. Considering its caliber, the 13.2 mm (approximately .50") used by both the Japanese Army and Navy on dual and single mounts, is a potent threat to low-flying planes. The standard Army 7.7 mm Heavy Machine Gun, when mounted on its special AA extension mount, has been used effectively against planes flying within its range. Figure 2 gives a graphic representation of the capabilities of these standard AA weapons all of which have been captured to date.

The Japanese Army has attempted to produce more powerful weapons than those shown in Figure 2. It is quite certain that 37 mm AA machine cannon is now being produced and there is some evidence of the existence of a new 6 barrelled AA machine gun, which probably uses the 13.2 mm gun. It is questionable, however, whether manufacture of either of these two items has reached the point where they are being supplied outside of the Japanese mainland.

At the beginning of the war, the Japanese Army AA fire-control equipment for heavy AA guns was limited, for all practical purposes, to a crude on-carriage and off-carriage system developed about 1928. In general, this system may be described as being similar to our old Case I $\frac{1}{2}$  method, and utilizes a stereoscopic height finder as part of the standard equipment. A model 97 (1937) AA Director, operating on the linear speed method, was apparently in process of development, but events to date have indicated that it was not manufactured in any quantity.



On the other hand, the Navy Model 2 (1942) AA Director, which was under manufacture in 1943 and 1944, and has been found on important islands of the inner perimeter, is a fairly effective AA fire-control instrument which utilizes the angular rates method of computation. Originally designed for use with naval dual purpose guns, by relatively simple insertion of appropriate drums this instrument can be used to control the fire of any of the AA Guns shown in Figure 1. This director is equipped with selsyns for electrical receipt of basic fire-control data from an exterior source, indicating its contemplated use with gun-laying radar. In view of the fact that this director can be used with practically any AA gun, provided appropriate ballistic drums are available, it is not surprising that one Naval director of this type was captured on Leyte emplaced for use with a battery of Army 75 mm guns. The guns themselves had been modified to the extent of installation of dials for the receipt of electrically transmitted fire control data, although instruments for use of the older "on-carriage and off-carriage system" were still present on the guns, apparently as an auxiliary method of fire control.

At the beginning of the war, the Japanese apparently had no gun-laying or searchlight control radar. During the Philippine and Malayan campaigns, American radars SCR-268 and SCR-270, and British CD/CHL, SLC, and GL Mark II, fell into the hands of the Japanese.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

CAPABILITIES OF JAPANESE

LAND BASED AA GUNS.



\*The maximum height at which a directly approaching aircraft flying at a ground speed of 300 mph can be engaged by an AA gun battery for 20 sec., assuming the first round is fired at maximum fuze, and the last round is fired at 70 degrees quadrant elevation. (This is an arbitrary standard.)

Fig. 1.


Reproduced by 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn.  
May 1945

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~





# CAPABILITIES OF JAPANESE AA AUTOMATIC WEAPONS



- (a) Estimated range at which the weapon, with available fire control, may be expected to produce occasional hits.  
 (b) Estimated range within which the weapon, with available fire control, can produce most effective fire.




Fig. 2.



JAP AA TRENDS

Captured documents confirm the fact that this equipment was carefully analyzed, and that later Japanese radar development was strongly influenced by the findings.

Recently, instances of accurate "unseen" fire from heavy guns and the performance of searchlights in certain areas have indicated that radar equipment is now in use. Captured documents have confirmed the existence of at least 8 types of Japanese gun-laying and searchlight control radar. All the types known appear to be largely copied from the British SLC and GL Mark II or the American SCR-268. It is not the equal of present Allied equipment, but it is certainly effective for searchlight control and will achieve fair results as gun-laying equipment. Known liaison with the Germans on this subject may be expected to influence future development along these lines.

AA fire-control for Japanese AA automatic weapons is limited to an on-carriage "course and speed" sight and a standard "speed ring" sight. So far as is known, the Japanese have not developed or produced any directors for use with their AA automatic weapons, or developed any electrical AA sight such as the German Flakvizier 38, 40 or 41.

At the beginning of the war most of the Japanese heavy AA gun batteries in the field were issued 4 guns as normal battery complement. Starting in 1941, however, there was a trend toward increasing the complement of the normal mobile AA heavy gun battery from 4 to 6 guns. This change-over took place over a period of time.

The most significant trend in the employment of AA weapons by the Japanese lies in the appearance of concentrated groups of two, three, and even four 6-gun batteries in vital areas on the Japanese mainland. It is interesting to note that this conforms to the German "Grossbatterien" system, a fairly recent development in German emplacement of their AA guns. In general, this "large battery" system calls for the use of several batteries of guns grouped together at one site, with fire-control for all guns emanating from one central source.

Deployment of AA guns in the Tokyo area, where recent aerial photo-coverage indicates the presence of about 400 heavy AA guns, is typical of this tendency. As an example, one AA gun site in the Tokyo area apparently consists of a group of four 6-gun batteries (24 guns) concentrated in a small area, all evidently receiving data from one gun-laying radar located in the immediate vicinity. Concentrated fire from effective AA guns in a group this size can be a serious hazard to planes flying in formation within range of the guns.

BRIEFS

"HANGING" BALLS OF FIRE

On the 20th of April, 21st Bomber Command reported that B-29s over JAPAN had encountered in addition to the previously reported flying balls of fire, another type of ball of fire with more intense light. This type is apparently fired from the ground. It was observed to hang in the air or descend slowly and then explode with great force.  
(21st BomCom Dispatch) (SECRET)

R E S T R I C T E D

Jap Offensive Use of Gas

(From Chemical Warfare Intelligence Bulletin No 51, 15 Mar 45)

Captured in MAFFIN area of northwest NEW GUINEA, a Jap document entitled "Transcript of Lectures on Landing Operations" was in the form of extracts from a mimeographed manual. Presented here is a portion dealing with the Japanese use of gas and toxic smokes in their own offensive landing operations.

"Situations which require particular care in the use of gas are outlined below:

1. The covering naval force and airplanes will neutralize areas adjacent to the landing point and key points along advance routes for enemy reinforcements.

2. Those of the enemy directly defending the landing point will be gassed, particularly the artillery.

3. The position of enemy rear forces, as well as their artillery, will be gassed.

4. The key points protecting the enemy's flanks will be devastated.

5. By the use of gas and smokes the enemy will be surprised and the landing operations will remain concealed."

BRIEFS

JAPANESE ANTI-TANK SQUAD

This unit has been trained to operate in two sections of three men each. No 1 of each section carried two smoke bombs, nos 2 and 3 each having two bags of dynamite. From the point of vantage, a cliff or a tree, No 1 threw his one or two smoke bombs, and nos 2 and 3 followed up with their explosives. The operations were intended to be covered by automatic rifle fire.

(INDIA-BURMA EEIST Bulletin No 7, 12 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

~~TOP SECRET~~

# North China and Manchuria

## Guerrilla Activity

(From WD, MID Captured Personnel and Material Branch  
Report, 28 Mar 45)

The following information is gained from a Jap PW and is believed to be reliable.

Since the war with AMERICA started, guerrilla activities have increased rather than decreased. In Southern MANCHURIA, the coastal areas between KWANTUNG and KOREA and the area surrounding YINGKOU, HOTEN-SHI, are especially dangerous for Japanese to travel in.

CHEFOO, SHANTUNG, is constantly being raided by three different bands of guerrillas (Wang, Chang and Communist Parties) who are hidden in the hills south of CHEFOO. Bandits are constantly changing from one party to another, depending upon which pays the highest wages.

Members of the Chang party have more pride in their organization and do not care so much about the pay. Although the officers will take most of the money from the men after they are paid, the latter will, in turn, be given time off to loot and plunder in CHEFOO or other towns.

In CHEFOO, anyone wearing Japanese style clothing or uniforms in the streets will be shot at. Consequently if a Japanese wishes to go there, he must wear Chinese clothing. In SHANGHAI anyone wearing Japanese or Manchurian clothing at night will be shot at, so Japanese civilians wear European style clothing.

PW believes that the Communist party is responsible for many trains being overturned in the vicinity of SHOTOKU, NEKKA-SHO.

### BRIEFS

#### JAP CHEMICAL LAND MINE

This mine is fired with a detonating cord wrapped around it five times. 25 grams will contaminate a circle approximately 11 yards in diameter. It is to be used in places where close combat will probably ensue. The mine contains 7 litres (approx 6 quarts) of Mk 1 (Mustard) weighing 9 Kg (20 lbs.)

(INDIA-BURMA EEIST, Bulletin No 7, 12 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

## Jap Surrenders Increase

On both IWO JIMA and TINIAN, the device of sending Japs already captured into caves and other hiding places to persuade their former comrades to surrender has been used with outstanding success. While the quantities in some instances have been unusually large on both of these islands, the tendency to interpret this in terms of a trend in the attitudes of the Japs towards surrender should be approached with caution.

On IWO, on 1 April fifteen Japs were taken prisoner in a cave. At 1000 hours that day a PW volunteered to go inside the cave with instructions that the Japs would be given one hour to come out. At 1130, a wounded Jap emerged and informed the patrol that the PW who entered the cave at 1000 had been bound by the entombed Japs to prevent his escape. At 1600 a bangalore torpedo was lowered into an air vent of the cave and exploded. Fourteen Japs rushed out and were taken prisoner. The PW who was held by the Japs dug his way out after the explosion. One of the prisoners was Lt Comdr INADA Masaru, Naval Medical officer attached to the IWO JIMA Naval Guard Unit. He said that this cave was a dispensary unit and that there were twenty Japs remaining in another part of the cave. The Jap Naval officer was ignorant of the present situation on the island, believing that he was being captured at the front lines. He had been in this cave since 3 March 1945.

On 2 April twenty-seven more prisoners were taken and on the next day thirty-two. Almost every day resulted in the bagging of some Japs, and on 16 April the following occurred. An infantry patrol with the aid of interpreters and PsW, worked a cave which had been "talked into" for four hours the day before with no results. After two hours of talking during the morning, the Japs handed out a Red Cross flag, a Japanese flag and a note written in English. Following is a verbatim copy of the note: "To the American Forces - There is a field hospital of the Japanese Army in these holes. Several battle men who had come back from the front have also lived here. But a few days ago they went to somewhere and now here are living only medical members and patients. So we lift up the Red Cross flag today and we are doing only our medical duty. We have never resisted and we will never fight against you. Please know our mind and never attack us as the treaty of the International Red Cross Society. - Head of the Hospital."

After two hours of discussion between the Japs in the cave and the volunteer PW, seventy - three PsW surrendered. The prisoners consisted of thirteen officers, one Warrant Officer and fifty-nine enlisted men. With the exception of one officer who was seriously wounded and died when taken to the 41st Station Hospital, all Jap officers were wearing clean dress uniforms and appeared in excellent health. All prisoners were wearing Red Cross insignia.

It should be noted that the two occurrences quoted above represent varying degrees of persuasion, the Japs in the first instance being virtually blasted from their cave and into captivity by the bangalore torpedo. In other instances however, less violent argument by a captured Jap, either over a loud speaker system or by direct conversation has proved very effective.

JAP SURRENDERS INCREASE

During the first half of April, a story similar to the foregoing was told on TINIAN. From the 1st through the 15th of the month, a total of ninety-five Japanese military was taken prisoner. On TINIAN, as well as on IWO JIMA, Japs already captured have been highly instrumental in the inducing of others to surrender.

The TINIAN Periodic Report of 16 April 1945 related that the prisoners were customarily taken back into the area where they had been in hiding to contact their friends, and tell them how they have been treated after being taken into custody by our forces. Those who are willing to give up are then led by the PsW to a rendezvous where they may surrender without danger from ambushes. After Japanese military still at large in a certain area have been contacted by Prisoners of War, the word that they can surrender in safety soon travels to all others in hiding in that sector. This accomplishes some of the missionary work for later patrols in that sector. When such groups fail to make contact with patrols, they sometimes come out and surrender to an outpost or sentry.

The facts appear to bear out known premises of psychological warfare, in demonstrating that the Jap will indeed surrender if the points can be made that he will not be shot, either by our troops or his own, that he will not be tortured but will on the contrary receive food and good treatment, and finally that he can accomplish these things without irrevocable loss of honor. An effective tried medium carrying conviction on these points is one of the Jap's own race and one of his former soldiers in arms.

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Japanese Operations Order

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1957, 15 Apr 45)

Captured on LUZON, the following Operations Order of the Central Force, Ultra Secret, dated 21 Feb 25 is in the best Bushido tradition.

"1. Those in each unit who are wounded and sick and are unable to engage in combat will carry two days rations to the corner of the fortress on or about the 21st and will commit mass suicide.

"2. Each unit CO will put a responsible man in charge to witness their deaths.

"3. Freedom of meditation for a day and a night will be granted prior to suicide so that each man may attain for himself the determination of gladly sacrificing himself for the country."

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G-2 Sixth Army, APO 442	1	CG, 5th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
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Combat Tng Command, APO 957	5	Commandant, Mar Corps Sch, Quantico	
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